We investigate the networks of committee and subcommittee assignments in the United States House of Representatives from the 101st-108th Congresses, with the committees connected by "interlocks" or common membership. We examine the community structure in these networks using several methods, revealing strong links between certain committees as well as an intrinsic hierarchical structure in the House as a whole. We identify structural changes, including additional hierarchical levels and higher modularity, resulting from the 1994 election, in which the Republican party earned majority status in the House for the first time in more than forty years. We also combine our network approach with analysis of roll call votes using singular value decomposition to uncover correlations between the political and organizational structure of House committees.
I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the detailed work in making United States law is performed by Congressional committees and subcommittees. This contrasts with parliamentary democracies such as Great Britain and Canada, in which a larger part of the legislative process is directly in the hands of political parties or is conducted in sessions of the entire parliament. While the legislation drafted by committees in the U.S. Congress is subject ultimately to roll call votes by the full Senate and House of Representatives, the important role played by committees and subcommittees makes the study of their formation and composition vital to understanding the work of the American legislature.
The presence of committees in the House endows it with obvious hierarchical levels: individual Representatives, subcommittees, standing committees, and the entire House floor.
However, it is desirable to examine social networks in the House of Representatives quantitatively to determine whether it has any additional structure that might relate to collaborative Education and the Workforce, the Subcommittee on Education Reform, the Subcommittee on 21st Century Competitiveness, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Rules (setting the terms for the scrutiny of the bill) before being approved by the full House [56] . After the Senate further amended the bill, a conference agreement eventually passed both houses of Congress and the final bill was signed by the President to become public law No. 107-110.
Analyzing the structure of the committee system in the House of Representatives and studying its correlation with the partisanship of its constituent Representatives helps achieve a better understanding of political party competition in Congress. Several contrasting theories of committee assignment have been developed in the political science literature shows a similar but less pronounced shift. There is no noticeable trend in the Democrat-majority 101st-103rd Houses in (a), but it seems to shift up a bit in (b) to reveal a drift covering all eight Congressional terms we studied.
(mostly through qualitative studies, although there have been some quantitative ones; see [4, 9, 16, 29, 41, 52] ), but there is no consensus explanation of how committee assignments are initially determined or how they are modified from one two-year term of Congress to the next. A question of particular interest is whether political parties assign committee memberships essentially at random or if, for instance, one can show using objective analyses that influential Congressional committees are "stacked" with partisan party members.
Our study of the organizational structure of Congress draws on network theory, which provides powerful tools for representing and analyzing complex systems of connected agents.
While the quantitative study of real-world networks has a long history in the social sciences (see, for example, the discussions in [33, 60] ), such investigations experienced a major expansion in popularity in the late 1990s, in part because of interest in the Internet and online networks. This increased attention has been especially evident in studies of large social, biological, and technological networks, which have relied on major advancements in computer hardware and algorithms to generate novel results [1, 13, 33, 55, 60] . Among the myriad topics that have been studied are evolving social groups [28] , collaborations [19] , community detection [11] , and hierarchical organization [49, 51] . It is the modular and hierarchical community structure of networks that primarily concern us in our present study of Congressional committee assignments.
The Congressional networks studied here are examples of collaboration networks, on which there is a considerable body of previous literature. Networks constructed from collaborations between corporate boards of directors [30, 31, 32, 50, 59] are especially germane to the present work, as such collaborations occupy a position in the business world somewhat analogous to that of collaborations between Congressional committee members. Previous studies have shown that board memberships play a major role in the spread of attitudes, ideas, and practices through the corporate world, affecting investment strategies [21] , political donations [59] , and even the stock market on which a company is listed [48] . Studies of the structure of corporate networks have shed light on the mechanisms and pathways of information diffusion [6, 7, 12] , and we believe that the structure of congressional committees may turn out to be similarly revealing.
As we show here, network methods are particularly effective at uncovering structure among committee and subcommittee assignments in Congress, without the need to incorporate any specific knowledge about committee members or their political positions. In a recent article [47] , the present authors formulated and briefly examined a number of committee assignment networks, looking, for instance, at the partisanship of the Select Committee on Homeland Security in the 107th House and its connections to other committees.
An alternative network perspective on the structure of Congress has been offered by J. H.
Fowler [14, 15] , who examined the network defined by the cosponsorship of legislation by Members of Congress. In the present work, we compare our previous observations to those for the 108th House and explore the structural changes in the networks that resulted from the 1994 Congressional elections in which the Republican party gained majority control of the House. A detailed technical discussion of the methods used to obtain our results is included in the appendices. This paper is organized as follows. First, we define the bipartite collaboration networks determined by the assignments of Representatives to House committees and subcommittees.
We then investigate the hierarchical and modular structure of these networks using several different community detection methods. We also incorporate singular value decomposition (SVD) analysis of House roll call votes into our study of the House's community structure.
We provide additional details in two appendices: in Appendix A, we explain the methods used in our SVD analysis of voting patterns; in Appendix B, we give a detailed comparison of several methods for community detection in networks, including our generalization of a recently proposed local detection algorithm [3] to weighted networks.
II. COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT NETWORKS IN THE HOUSE
We represent each of the 101st-108th terms of the U.S. House of Representatives as a separate bipartite (two-mode) network based on assignments of Representatives to committees and subcommittees (henceforth called just "committees" for simplicity). The two types of nodes in these networks correspond to Representatives and committees, with edges connecting each Representative to the committees on which he or she sits. The period we study (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) spans the political changes following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 [56] , as well as the 1994 elections in which the Republican party won majority control of the House for the first time in more than forty years. We construct one network for each two-year Congressional term from data published by the Clerk's Office of the House of Representatives [57] , ignoring changes in committee assignments that occur while a term is underway.
Each network includes roughly 440 Representatives (including non-voting Delegates and midterm replacements), about 20 standing committees, and more than 100 subcommittees, with an average of about 6 committee assignments per Representative. Because of the relatively high edge density (about 5% of possible connections are present), some frequently studied network statistics, such as geodesic path lengths, turn out to be unrevealing in this case. Therefore, we instead focus our attention on the community structure of the networks and associated measures such as modularity and Horton-Strahler numbers. We discuss these analyses in Section III.
With data for eight consecutive Congresses, it is natural to ask how the committee assignment network changes in time. One question of interest is whether the networks contain signs of the so-called "Republican Revolution" of 1994 that ended forty years of Democratic majorities in the House of Representatives, the longest span of single-party rule in Congressional history [27] . That is, can one observe structural differences in the committee assignment networks between the Democrat-majority Houses (101st-103rd) and (sub)committees is assigned a strength (indicated by the link's darkness) equal to the normalized interlock. (The "interlock" between two committees is equal to the number of their common members. The normalization takes committee sizes into account by dividing the raw interlock by the expected number of common members if assignments were determined independently and uniformly at random.) Thus, lines between pairs of circles or pairs of squares represent normalized degree of joint membership between (sub)committees (it is because of this normalization that lines between squares are typically very light), and lines between squares and circles represent the fraction of standing committee members on subcommittees. This figure is drawn using a variant of the Kamada-Kawai spring-embedding visualization, which takes link strengths into account [25] . the Republican-majority ones (104th-108th)? As one means of addressing this question, we compute the degree of each node, defined as the number of edges connected to it. Because the committee assignment networks are bipartite, we construct two types of cumulative (integrated) degree distributions [40] and examine how they changed across Congresses.
One distribution (Fig. 1a) indicates the number of committees on which each Representative sits, and the other (Fig. 1b) gives the number of Representatives on each committee. We do not observe a significant trend in Democrat-majority Houses, although a slow increase in committee sizes is revealed in Fig. 1b . The committee reorganization that accompanied the formation of the Republican-majority 104th House, however, produced a sharp decline in the typical numbers of committee and subcommittee assignments per Representative, but the trend in subsequent Republican-majority Congresses has been a slow increase in both AGRICULTURE   LIVESTOC K AND HORTICUL TURE DEPAR TMEN T OPER ATION S, OVER SIGHT , NUTRI TION AND FORES TRY   CON SER VAT ION, CRE DIT, RUR AL DEV ELO PME NT AND RES EAR CH  SPE CIA LTY CRO PS the numbers of assignments and the committee sizes. These trends are visible in Fig. 1 .
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While rich in their data content, the two-mode networks of committee assignments are difficult to visualize and interpret. A common strategy in such cases is to examine instead a one-mode "projection" of the network onto either the committees or the Representatives.
In our studies, we have made considerable use of the projection onto the committees, in which a network is created whose nodes represent the committees and whose edges represent Congress in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 [26] , has a strong connection to the 13-member Rules Committee (with a normalized interlock of 7.4 from two common members), which is the committee charged with deciding the rules and order of business under which legislation is considered by other committees and the full House [56] .
The Homeland Security Committee is also connected to the 7-member Legislative and Budget Process Subcommittee of Rules by the same two common members (with normalized interlock 13.7). In the 108th Congress (see Fig. 4 ), the Homeland Security Committee swelled to 50 members but maintained a close association with the Rules Committee (with a normalized interlock of 4.1 from 6 common members).
III. THE HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE OF COMMITTEES
We now turn to an examination of community structure in the networks of committees based on the one-mode projection described above. We do this using several methods of hierarchical clustering, in which one begins with a network and ends up (by construction) with a hierarchical (tree) structure. In this section, we discuss the hierarchical clustering method known as single linkage clustering [24] . We found similar results using several alternative community detection methods, which are discussed in detail in Appendix B.
For each of these methods, we quantify the organizational structures we find using Horton-
Strahler numbers (to indicate the number of hierarchical levels) and modularity (to indicate the compartmentalization into different groups).
To implement single linkage clustering, we start with the complete set of committees for a given Congress. We then join committees sequentially starting with the pair with the greatest normalized interlock, followed by the next greatest, and so forth. This process generates "clusters" of committees, which can be represented using a tree or dendrogram, such as that shown in Fig. 5 for the 107th House. Closer examination of the dendrograms in 
R E A D IN E S S T O T A L F O R C E T A C T IC A L A IR A N D L A N D F O R C E S T E R R O R IS M , U N C O N V E N T IO N A L T H R E A T S A N D C A P A B IL IT IE S S T R A T E G IC F O R C E S G O V E R N M E N T R E F O R M N A T IO N A L S E C U R IT Y , E M E R G IN G T H R E A T S A N D IN T E R N A T IO N A L R E L A T IO N S TE C H N O LO G Y , IN FO R M A TI O N P O LI C Y , IN TE R G O V E R N M E N TA L R E LA TI O N S A N D TH E G O VE R N M EN T EF FI C IE N C Y A N D FI N A N C IA L M A N A G EM EN T CR IM IN AL JU ST IC E, DR UG PO LI CY AN D HU M AN RE SO UR CE S CI VIL SE RV IC E AN D AG EN CY RE OR

INF RA STR UC TUR E AN D BO RD ER SEC UR ITY EM ER GE NC Y PR EP AR ED NE SS AN D RE SP ON SE CY BE RS EC UR ITY , SC IE NC E, AN D RE SE AR CH AN D DE VE LO PM EN T IN TE LL IG EN CE AN D CO UN TE RT ER RO RI SM W A TE R R ES O U R C ES A N D EN VI R O N M EN T H O U S IN G A N D C O M M U N IT Y O P P O R TU N IT Y F IN A N C IA L S E R V IC E S F IN A N C IA L IN S T IT U T IO N S A N D C O N S U M E R C R E D IT O V E R S IG H T A N D IN V E S T IG A T IO N S C A P IT A L M A R K E T S , IN S U R A N C E A N D G O V E R N M E N T S P O N S O R E D E N T E R P R IS E S D O M E S T IC A N D IN T E R N A T IO N A L M O N E T A R Y P O L IC Y , T R A D E , A N D T E C H N O L O G Y
IN T E R N A T IO N A L R E L A T IO N S A S IA A N D T H E P A C IF IC A F R IC A T H E M ID D L E E A S T A N D C E N T R A L A S IA
IN T E R N A T IO N A L T E R R O R IS M , N O N P R O L IF E R A T IO N A N D H U M A N R IG H T S E U R O P E T H E W E S T E R N H E M IS P H E R E R E S O U R C E S
SE LE CT RE VE NU E ME AS UR ES AP PR OP RI AT IO NS
A G R IC U LT U R E, R U R A L D EV EL O PM EN T, FO O D A N D D R U G A D M IN IS TR A TI O N A N D M IL IT A R Y C O N S TR U C TI O N V A , H U D A N D IN D E P E N D E N T A G E N C IE S D IS T R IC T O F C O L U M B IA E N E R G Y A N D W A T E R D E V E L O P M E N T L E G IS L A T IV E T R A N S P O R T A T IO N , T R E A S U R Y
A N D As shown in Figure 5 , we can enrich the analysis by color-coding each committee according to the mean "extremism" of its members. Extremism is determined using the results of a singular value decomposition analysis of Representatives' voting records that places each
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Representative on a scale that runs, roughly speaking, from the most partisan Republican members of the House to the most partisan Democrats (the SVD analysis is described in detail in Appendix A). The extremism of a committee is then quantified as the average deviation of its members from the mean on this scale. Committees composed of highly partisan members of either party appear in red in Fig. 5 and those containing more moderate
Representatives appear in blue. Taking again the examples of Intelligence and Homeland Security, we can immediately identify the former as moderate and the latter as more partisan.
Indeed, the Select Committee on Homeland Security has a larger mean extremism than any of the 19 standing Committees and has the 4th largest mean extremism among the 113 committees of the 107th House (see Table I ). This is perhaps not so surprising when we see 
IV. MODULARITY
To further investigate the observed hierarchies in the House committee assignment networks, we employ the statistic known as modularity, modified to allow for the weighted nature of our networks. Consider first an unweighted network, which is divided into some number of groups of vertices. The modularity m for this division into groups is defined to be [35] 
where e ij denotes the fraction of ends of edges in group i for which the other end of the edge lies in group j and a i = j e ij is the fraction of all ends of edges that lie in group i. Modularity measures the difference between the total fraction of edges that fall withinrather than between-groups (the first term) and the fraction one would expect if edges were placed at random (respecting vertex degrees). Thus, high values of the modularity indicate partitions of the network in which more of the edges fall within groups than one would expect by chance. This, in turn, has been found to be a good indicator of functional network divisions in many cases [37] .
The projected one-mode networks we consider here are weighted. In our calculations, we therefore employ the weighted generalization of modularity described in [34] , in which instead of counting numbers of edges falling between particular groups, we count the sums of the weights of those edges, so that heavily weighted edges contribute more than lightly weighted ones. Both e ij and a i can be generalized in this fashion in a straightforward manner, and then the modularity is again calculated from Eq. (1). The meaning of the modularity remains essentially the same: it measures when a particular division of the network has more edge weight within groups than one would expect on the basis of chance.
We use modularity to quantify the organizational divisions of the networks and to compare the dendrograms to each other. In particular, the modularity values shown in Table II indicate that the dendrograms produced via single linkage clustering have a better-defined community structure (higher modularity) in the Republican-controlled Houses (104th-108th) than in the Democrat-controlled ones. Hence, with respect to the metric of normalized interlock, the committee reorganization following the Republican Revolution (which we already saw in Fig. 1a produced a sharp decline in the typical numbers of committee assignments
per Representative compared to the 101st-103rd Houses) seems also to have tightened the compartmentalization of the House committee assignments.
V. NUMBER OF HIERARCHICAL LEVELS
Another interesting feature of dendrograms is the depth of their hierarchical organization, the particular branch of the tree with that specific subcommittee as the leaf. In Table VIII of Appendix B, we compare S = max j S j , the meanS = S j , and the standard deviation σ = (S j −S) 2 1/2 in the 101st-108th Houses for single linkage clustering, two betweennessbased dendrograms, and our local community detection method to quantify the statistics of the hierarchical levels revealed by each method. Second, we also define a notion of Strahler numbers for communities (see Fig. 7 ), in which a given subtree (i.e., community) is assigned a Strahler number as if it were itself a full dendrogram. One way to characterize political positions is to tabulate individuals' voting records on selected key issues (via, for example, interest group ratings), but such a method is subjective by nature and a procedure that involves less personal judgment is preferable. Here we apply the "multi-dimensional scaling" technique known as singular value decomposition (SVD) [18, 53] to the complete voting records of each session of the House [45, 46] . Each two-year term of Congress is treated in isolation from the others. Other methods of analysis [23, 42] , such as the Bayesian approach of [8] , also yield useful results. The advantages of multi-dimensional scaling techniques versus factor analysis (which has a long tradition in political science) in analyzing voting data are discussed in detail in [5] .
We define an n×m voting matrix B with one row for each of the n Representatives in the shown that
where σ k ≥ 0 for all k. The matrix B (r) , r < n, with elements
approximates the full voting matrix B. The sum of the squares of the errors in the elements is equal to To an excellent approximation, we find that a Representative's voting record can be characterized by just two coordinates. That is, B (2) ij is a good approximation to B ij . Observing that one of the two directions correlates well with party affiliation for members of the two major parties, we call this the "partisan" coordinate. We call the other direction the "bipartisan" coordinate, as it correlates well with how often a Representative votes with the majority. Because Senators are generally better known than Representatives, we plot as an example the coordinates along these first two eigenvectors for the 107th Senate in Fig. 8a . One can use a truncation of the SVD to construct an approximation to the votes in the full roll call [53] . For instance, with our two-dimensional approximation to the voting matrix, we assign "yea" or "nay" votes to individuals based on the signs of the corresponding elements of the matrix. In Fig. 8b , we show the fraction of actual votes correctly reconstructed by this approximation, which gives a measure of the "predictability" of the Senators in the 107th Congress. For both parties, moderate Senators are less predictable than hardliners. The two-dimensional projection correctly reconstructs the votes of some hard-line Senators for as many as 97% of the votes they cast. Examining the apparent outliers in Fig. 8b , the votes Senator Jeffords cast as a Republican appear here to make him the least "predictable" Senator. However, it is important to emphasize that Jeffords cast relatively few votes as a member of the Republican party, so it is not surprising that this behavior is less predictable because the voting record includes a large number of artificial absences. The Having demonstrated the application of SVD to the analysis of the voting records of the Senate, let us now return to the House of Representatives. For the 107th House, we find that the leading eigenvector accounts for about 45.3% of the variance of the voting matrix, the second eigenvector accounts for about 29.6%, and no other eigenvector accounts for more than 1.6%. We obtain similar results for other recent Congresses, with two eigenvectors giving a good approximation to the voting matrix in every case (see Table III ). In Fig. 9 , we plot these two coordinates for every member of the House of Representatives for each of the 102nd-107th Congresses. It has been shown previously using other methods that Congressional voting positions are well-approximated by just two coordinates [44, 45] , but it is important to emphasize that different identification methods treat the "bipartisan" direction differently. In particular, some methods eliminate it entirely and associate the two remaining dimensions with partisanship and an additional direction often identified as a North-South axis, which was historically important during periods of heightened concern about civil rights [44, 45] . The SVD analysis here keeps the "bipartisan" coordinate, making identifications in a particularly simple fashion straight from the voting matrix containing the roll call data.
As with the Senate, we find that the leading eigenvector corresponds closely to the acknowledged political party affiliation of the Representatives, with Democrats (blue) on the left and Republicans (red) on the right in the plots [63] . Representatives who score highly on this "partisan" coordinate-either positively or negatively-tend often to vote with members of their own party. From this coordinate, we also compute a measure of "extremism" for each Representative as the absolute value of their partisan coordinate relative to the mean partisan score of the full House. That is, we define the extremism e i of a Representative by e i = |p i − µ|, where p i is the Representative's partisanship score and µ is the mean value (usually skewed slightly towards the majority party) of that coordinate for the entire House. In Table IV Table V . Observe, for example, that the relative variance versus that expected from random committee and subcommittee assignments increases with every Congress (with the largest increase occurring between the 106th and 107th Houses).
Using the SVD results, we can also calculate the positions of the votes (as opposed to the voters) along the same two leading dimensions to quantify the nature of the issues being decided. We show this projection for the 107th House in Fig. 10 . One application of this analysis is a measurement of the reproducibility of individual votes and outcomes.
Reconstituting the voting matrix as before using only the information contained in the two leading singular values and the corresponding eigenvectors and summing the resulting approximated votes over all Representatives, we derive a single score for each vote. Making individual yeas or nays according to the sign of the matrix elements, and then observe which outcome has a majority in the resulting roll call-the two-dimensional reconstruction still identifies 939 (about 94.8%) of the outcomes correctly. We repeated these calculations for the 101st-106th Houses and found similar results in each case (see Table VI ). The remarkable accuracy of SVDs in reconstructing votes was previously observed for U.S. Supreme Court cases in [53] . The Optimal Classification (OC) technique of [46] (see also [44] ) also generates In making the connection between the voting record and committee assignment networks, we remark that we constructed the committee assignment networks representing the 101st-107th Houses from documents obtained from the website of the U. S. House of Representatives Office of the Clerk [57] , which were based on the committee assignments at the end of each Congress. The roll calls, by contrast, include votes from Representatives who subsequently died or resigned and hence were not present at the end of the session. Our networks also include Representatives (such as non-voting Delegates) who do not appear in the voting record. To combine the network structures with the political spectra (as determined using the SVD analysis), it was thus necessary to reconcile the two data sets by removing a few Representatives in each of these categories (about 5-10 from each roll call and 5-10 from each network). In situations where we have incorporated political spectra into our network analysis, it is always with this slightly abridged set of Representatives. The subsequent SVD computations show little change as a result of these adjustments.
APPENDIX B: COMMUNITY DETECTION ALGORITHMS
The results in the main text of this paper use single linkage clustering to determine the community structure of the network of committees, but several other methods can also be used (see, for example, [11, 17] and references therein). It is of interest to ask whether our results are robust with respect to changes in the method employed. To address this question, we have explored three other methods: two based on "betweenness" measures calculated on the full bipartite networks of Representatives and committees and a local community detection algorithm for weighted networks, generalized from the method for unweighted networks introduced in [3] . As we now describe, we obtain similar groupings with these different algorithms, although with some differences, suggesting that the large-scale features (but perhaps not the details) observed in our single-linkage clustering calculations are fundamental properties of the networks and not a result of our choice of methodology.
Betweenness-based community detection
Communities can be detected in many cases using "betweenness" measures that iteratively pick out and remove high-traffic edges (or other network components) that lie on a large number of paths between vertices. Repeated application of such a procedure eventually fragments a network into components, with the entire process represented by dendrograms similar to those generated by standard hierarchical clustering [17, 38, 39] .
We have performed a corresponding calculation modified slightly to respect the bipartite nature of the committee assignment networks, for which betweenness can be computed by counting the number of shortest paths between pairs of committees that traverse each edge in the network. Additionally, we compute betweenness from densities of random walks between committees rather than from geodesics (see [36] ), in part because the small diameter of the network often leads to many non-unique geodesics. We use this betweenness measure in two different algorithms. In one, we sequentially remove those edges (i.e., committee assignments) with highest betweenness. In the other, we sequentially remove the nodes (i.e., Representatives) lying on the largest number of paths. Applying these two methods to the full (unweighted) bipartite committee assignment graphs avoids altogether the projection onto a one-mode network and the definition of the normalized interlock used in single linkage clustering.
Comparing the different community detection schemes, we see that the dendrogram for the 107th House determined from random-walk betweenness and edge removal (see Fig. 11 )
shows four levels of hierarchical organization and again reveals the tight connections between the Rules Committee (and its subcommittees) and the Select Committee on Homeland Security. We also again observe the close ties between the Intelligence Committee and its subcommittees. However, other connections seemingly apparent in the single linkage clustering However, the portion with the Rules Committee and Select Committee on Homeland Security has a value of 3. This grouping therefore gives meaningful organizational information (in that it refers to an actual clique in the network), even though the tree as a whole does not show a tremendous amount of hierarchical structure.
Weighted Local Community Detection
We have also constructed dendrograms from the one-mode committee networks using a local community-detection algorithm generalized from a method for unweighted networks developed by Bagrow and Bollt [3] . The goal of this algorithm is to find a highly connected set of nodes (a "local community") near each node and to combine these individual (potentially overlapping) communities for each node into a hierarchical community structure. We again use the network of committees weighted by normalized interlocks that we considered for single linkage clustering.
To detect communities, we start with a given House's (one-mode) adjacency matrix A, whose element A ij gives the normalized interlock between the ith and jth committees. For convenience, we further normalize these elements by the maximum normalized interlock, so that 0 ≤ A ij ≤ 1. We use these weights as inverse distances to compute a distance matrix D,
where the element D ij designates the shortest distance along any path from the ith node to the jth node. We then define a clustering coefficient k of a selected group of n nodes as the sum of all weights within that group divided by 1 2 n(n − 1). In our generalization of the algorithm in [3] , we define the d-shell of node i to be all nodes within distance d of i according to the distance matrix. We identify the local community of the ith node to be the largest d-shell of node i with k ≥ α for some threshold α. As α is increased, the definition of a local community becomes more stringent and smaller cliques are obtained.
Using a "membership matrix" that encodes this combined information (see Fig. 12 ),
we manipulate the resulting collection of local communities to produce dendrograms (this procedure is described in Ref. [3] ). An unsorted membership matrix N collects the ensemble of information about the local communities of each node as originally ordered in the data.
Because each subcommittee is listed with its parent committee in the data ordering, this unsorted membership matrix (Fig. 12a) is already nearly block partitioned. The jth element of the ith row has the value 1 if node j is part of i's community and the value 0 if not. We compare the values in two rows (i and k) and define a distance ∆ between them according to the number of times they differ:
where δ is 1 if N il = N kl and 0 if not. As discussed in Ref. [3] , we then compute a sorted membership matrixÑ as follows: (1) compute the distance ∆(i, l) for all rows l > i; (2) swap the row i + 1 with the row i ∆ that has the smallest distance to row i (equivalent to interchanging vertex labels, so columns i and i ∆ must also be swapped); (3) One can depict the network's communities (and how strongly they are connected to each other) at a given level of organization using pie charts (which provide a coarse-graining of the network reminiscent of the "cartographic" visualization of networks discussed in [20] ).
For example, Fig. 13 Community sizes vary roughly with the threshold parameter α (which is selected to give the highest maximum modularity), with smaller values of α typically yielding larger communities by construction. Using the 107th House as an example, we can see from Table VII and the   combination of Figs. 7 , 12, and 13 that this weighted local community detection seemingly indicates a relatively small amount of overlap between the locally-defined communities.
Direct comparison of dendrograms
In Table II , we list for each of our methods the maximum modularity obtained for a single "cut" through the dendrogram and the average modularity over all possible cuts. A cut signifies an organizational level of a dendrogram; we depict a cut graphically using a concentric circular ring of the appropriate radius that divides inter-community links (those outside the ring) from intra-community ones. See, for example, the dendrogram in Fig. 7 and the resulting community-composition pie chart in Fig. 13 . For the weighted local community detection method, we used the values of the local clustering threshold α (denoted α 1 , . . . , α 8
for the 101st-108th Houses) giving the dendrograms with highest maximum modularity.
These values are given in Table VII . Similar modularity values are obtained over a relatively broad range of α. To see the number of organizational levels revealed by each algorithm, we list in Table VIII the maximum, mean, and standard deviation of the local Strahler numbers for the dendrograms produced for each House. Observe, for example, that the weighted local community detection method finds the largest number of organizational levels.
We compare dendrograms at the cuts (organizational levels) corresponding to their respective maximum modularities. Table IX collects these comparisons across the different clustering algorithms considered for each of the 101st-108th Houses. We compare the algorithms in pairs, with each tabulated entry indicating the fraction of committee pairs classified in the same manner by both methods (that is, both methods identify the committee pair as belonging to the same community or both methods identify the pair as belonging to separate communities). Although we list the results from specific maximum-modularity cuts in Table IX , we obtained similar values over broad ranges of cuts in the dendrograms.
To illustrate these results, we compare the similarity scores in Table IX to the dendrograms for the 107th House produced using single linkage clustering (Fig. 5) , betweennessbased edge removal (Fig. 11) , and our local community detection method (Fig. 7) , as well as the single linkage clustering dendrogram for the 108th House (Fig. 6) . The maximummodularity cuts in these dendrograms have 28, 5, 8 , and 25 communities, respectively.
Several observations are evident from Even when the quantitative measure of community similarity at the preferred cuts is low, many committees of interest nevertheless get grouped similarly in dendrograms produced from multiple methods, suggesting that the observed close ties between these committees are properties of the networks themselves rather than of the algorithms used. For example, the Select Committee on Homeland Security of the 107th House is grouped with the Rules Committee and its subcommittees using single linkage clustering (Fig. 5) , the weighted local community determination method (Fig. 7) , and the edge-betweenness based method (Fig. 11) claim that these connections are inherent properties of the networks themselves. Senators range from 74% predictable to 97% predictable. Only connections between different communities are depicted (with thicker lines indicating stronger connections); the intra-community edges are not visible at this level of organization.
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